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Abstract
In determining the magnitude of oil shocks to the
economies of Southern Africa, it is essential that we
examine the various components of vulnerability, as
well as the crude oil price movements and the rela-
tionship between energy and development.
Because energy consumers and producers are con-
strained by their energy consuming appliances
which are fixed n the short-run, thus making it diffi-
cult to shift to less oil intensive means of production
in response to higher oil prices, oil price shocks
increase the total import bill for a country largely
because of the huge increase in the cost of oil and
petroleum products. Low-income countries and
poorer households tend to suffer the largest impact
from oil price rise.
Keywords: vulnerability, oil intensities, price shocks,
oil dependence
Introduction
Most Southern African countries are completely
depended on imported oil as a primary energy
source and are therefore highly vulnerable to oil
price shocks. The oil price increases have significant
impacts on the economy’s level of real gross domes-
tic product (GDP) and economic performance. The
oil price increases reduce the national output,
change the structure of spending and production
and shifts the economy to a lower economic growth
path. This affects the rate of inflation and, at the
same time, alters the structure of relative prices, and
the economy’s import bills are strained adding to
the adverse shift in their terms of trade. The actual
impact of oil changes varies markedly by country,
and depends on, at least, two factors: the degree to
which they are net oil importers and the energy and
oil intensities of their economies. 
The purpose of this study is to determine the
magnitude of oil price shocks to the economies of
Southern Africa. We do so by first providing a back-
ground about the energy and development in these
economies, look at international crude oil price
movements, and then determine Southern Africa’s
energy and oil intensities, and oil dependence
aspects. Oil price shocks increase the total import
bill largely because of the huge increase in the cost
of oil and petroleum products. The International
Energy Outlook (2004 p5, 25) argues that the link
between energy consumption and economic
growth are closely correlated in developing coun-
tries, with energy demand growth tending to track
the rate of economic expansion. Bacon and Mattar
(p1 2005) also report that low-income countries
and poorer households in developing countries suf-
fer the largest impact from oil price rise.
The organization of this paper is as follows. The
first section looks at energy and development to
understand the economies being discussed. This is
followed by a brief discussion on the price of crude
oil. We then show in the third section, the method-
ology for looking at vulnerability and then discuss
our findings. The Southern African countries we
consider all fall within the Southern African
Development Community (SADC). For the most
part, our observations range from 1994, when
South Africa won its first democratic elections, to
2003 as determined by data availability.
Energy and development
Southern African economies
The individual economies of Southern African
countries are structurally diverse, their economic
performance is mixed, and they are at different
stages of development. South Africa has the most
developed, diversified and self-driven economy,
with the gross domestic product (GDP) that is more
than double of the other Southern African countries
combined (Figure 1). For most of the economies,
the agricultural contribution to GDP dominates
other sectors. Oil production is Angola’s backbone
of the economy, and the upstream oil industry con-
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tributes about 50% to GDP and is the major source
of the country’s foreign exchange. Botswana’s
export sector is dominated by diamond mining, and
the government is aiming to diversify the export
base and reduce the vulnerability of relying on dia-
monds. Persistent macroeconomic instability and
poor links between the capital intensive oil sector
and the rest of the economy in Angola, inappropri-
ate policy mix in Zimbabwe, and civil conflict in the
DRC have adversely affected the economic per-
formance of these countries. Economic growth is
attributed to restructuring in Tanzania, the diversifi-
cation of the economy in Zambia and Malawi, the
investment in the Lesotho water project and higher
manufacturing production in Lesotho, and con-
struction activities in Mozambique.
Low growth rates were experienced in the early
1990s as a result of the region-wide drought, the
‘Asian crisis’ resulting in depressed global demand,
and low international commodity prices. Civil con-
flict in the DRC explains negative GDP growth rates
from 1996 to 2000. While all countries had positive
growth rates in 2003, Botswana, Mozambique and
Tanzania achieved growth rates above 5% largely
because of sound economic management. Then is
the problem of inflation. The South African
Customs Union, consisting of countries which peg
their currencies to the South African Rand, experi-
enced sharp falls in average consumer price infla-
tion as the South African Rand continued to firm
against major currencies. The annual inflation rate
of 432% in Zimbabwe (IMF p22 2004) is attributed
to demand and supply imbalances in the economy
as well as a range of cost push factors. Estimates
further reveal that HIV/AIDS is reducing welfare
and depressing economic growth by up to 1.5%,
with the worst affected countries as South Africa,
Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho. High
oil prices have therefore added to the low growth
prospects of these national economies. 
Energy and GDP
Even given the paucity of oil resource endowment,
the presence or absence of refining capacity in any
of the countries is crucial. Refineries are concentrat-
ed in South Africa with a refining capacity of 708
000 billion barrels per day, with other refineries in
Angola (39 000 billion barrels per day), Tanzania
(14 000 billion barrels per day) and Zambia (23
750 billion barrels per day). South Africa exports
some of its refinery output to Botswana, Lesotho,
Swaziland and Namibia. Most of Malawi’s fuel
imports are supplied via Tanzanian and South
African ports. Pipelines transport crude oil from
Tanzania to Zambia and from Mozambique to
Zimbabwe. Supply is thus not only vulnerable to
supply interruption by oil producing countries and
high crude oil prices, but to the political stability of
transit countries as well. But the vulnerability of
these landlocked countries largely depends on the
degree of their dependence on oil imports and the
oil intensity of their economies. 
The South African economy dominates the
region’s consumption of both petroleum and total
energy (Figure 2). While it can be said that energy
consumption is an indicator of industrial progress
and the standard of living for its people, it is equal-
ly important to realise that rapid economic growth
requires increases in the consumption of commer-
cial energy.
The relationship between countries at the most
aggregated level (see Figure 3) is an almost perfect
positive correlation (R2 = 0.99) between energy
consumption and output or income or growth (as
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Note: Gross domestic product using market exchange rates per country, 2003
Figure 1: Gross domestic product per country, 2003
Source: Data based on IEA, 2003
measured by GDP). There is, however, ambiguous
about the direction of causation, leaving open
whether economic growth is a function of having
more energy, or whether energy arises from
increased economic growth. We argue, however,
that energy use while being a necessary input for
economic growth is also a function for growth. The
strength of this relationship varies among countries
and their stages of economic development. We also
observe that the estimates of South Africa (the
country with the highest output, GDP, R2 = 0.83)
and Lesotho (with the lowest output, GDP, R2 =
0.51), show that income elasticity of energy con-
sumption 1<Lesotho<South Africa or income elas-
ticity of high income countries >low income. It is
difficult to draw any conclusions about the real
meaning of these elasticities for reasons related to
the effects of technological improvements, the struc-
ture of GDP, and the need to isolate the composi-
tion of energy consumption in the energy/GDP rela-
tionship. However, the very strong correlation we
observe in Figure 3 between energy consumption
and growth indicates that economic activity is seri-
ously constrained without energy. To the extent that
economic growth, with the jobs and income and
development it creates, depends on price and reli-
able supplies of energy, and since energy consum-
ing technology is fixed in the short-run, oil price
hikes are bound to have an effect on national out-
put and other macroeconomic variables. 
Development
The biggest challenge facing Southern African
countries is to increase both development and eco-
nomic growth. These factors are linked with energy
demand. Table 1 captures various indicators for
development related to well-being, income inequal-
ity, and poverty and debt burden. The 2003 data
for the Human Development Index (HDI), equated
to well-being, shows that Botswana, Namibia,
South Africa and Zimbabwe achieved the medium
development status (50% < HDI < 79.9%), while
the rest of the Southern African countries fell under
the low level of human development (HDI < 50%)
classification. 
One must take into account that the static meas-
ure of HDI is not so comprehensive as to capture
entirely the concept of human development. Its
construction suffers from several problems like dis-
crepancies in data sources, lack of agreement in the
value to be included in the composite, and does not
capture a person’s ability to participate in decisions
that affect his/her life. The Gini coefficient, on the
other hand, measuring the degree of inequality in
the distribution of income, shows high coefficient
results (> 50%) for most countries, implying a
much skewed distribution of income in Southern
African economies. Even though the coefficients for
Tanzania and Mozambique are below 50%,
Mozambique is among those countries with the
worst levels of deprivation. The levels of poverty,
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Figure 2: Petroleum consumption, 2003
Source: Data based on IEA, 2003
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Figure 3: Energy and GDP in 2003
Source: Data based on IEA, 2003
measured by the Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) to
focus on the proportion of people below a thresh-
old level of basic human dimensions of human
development, show Swaziland, Mozambique, and
Botswana as the worst affected in 2003. When we
take into account an extremely contentious meas-
ure of US$2 a day (measured in purchasing power
parity terms) as a poverty line, Mozambique,
Zambia and Zimbabwe become the worst affected.
Poor households are thus forced to rely on non-
commercial sources of energy.
The debt burden Southern African countries
face is a major impediment to growth and econom-
ic transformation, since it diverts scarce resources,
retards achievement of sustainable development,
and inhibits productive investment. As Davidson
and Sokona point out (2005 p16), a significant
amount of debt was incurred for both development
and maintenance of the power sector, and repay-
ment of energy loans in financially stronger curren-
cies pose a hardship since energy services are paid
for in unstable local currencies. Together with exter-
nal factors such as the unfavourable terms of trade,
low export growth and high external volatility, crude
oil price hikes worsen the debt situation of Southern
African countries, and limits resources that can be
devoted to poverty alleviation or to meet the
Millennium Development Goals. Fortunately, the
debt burden is expected to improve because of
declining reliance on debt-creating flows and debt
forgiveness under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.
Crude oil price movements
We need to identify the ultimate movers and shak-
ers behind crude oil price movements. Analysis of
crude oil price movements on a global level can be
divided into three sub-periods, with different influ-
ences on price determination and pricing outcomes.
During the first period, international oil companies
fixed the price of crude oil, and the period was
characterized by occasional price shocks rather than
continuous price volatility. This price fixing lasted
until 1974 when OPEC producers took over the
role of fixing the reference price, and maintained
this role until 1986. Since 1986, the reference price
of crude oil in international trade has been deter-
mined in New York and London in the futures
exchanges for WTI and Brent, respectively. 
Futures prices are sensitive to expectations
about developments on supply and demand. These
expectations are fuelled by political and economic
factors. Mabro (2004) argues that once stability in
oil producing countries is under threat, this
unnerves the market and fuels expectations, with
fears of future development among crude oil traders
causing uneasiness about security of supplies.
There has also been concern about production
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Table 1: Development indicators, 2003
Figures compiled from the Human Development Report (2005) and IEA (2004)
Country Human develop- Gini Human poverty Population below Total external 
ment index1 coefficient index income poverty debt (in % 
(%) (%) (HPI – 1)2 (%) line US$2 a day of GDP)
1990- 2003
Angola 44.5 41.5 37.2
Botswana 56.5 63.0 48.4 50.1 17.8
Lesotho 49.7 63.2 47.6 56.1 47.0
Malawi 40.4 50.3 43.4 76.1 165.8
DRC 38.5 - 41.4 - 187.4
Mozambique 37.9 39.6 49.1 78.4 121.7
Namibia 62.7 70.7 33.0 55.8 2.3
South Africa 65.8 57.8 30.9 34.1 23.2
Swaziland 49.8 60.9 52.9 - 28.2
Tanzania 41.8 38.2 35.8 59.7 59.5
Zambia 39.4 52.6 46.4 87.4 129.3
Zimbabwe 50.5 56.8 45.9 83.0 55.3
1. HDI is a composite index of three measurable dimensions of human development: a decent standard of living (meas-
ured by real GDP per capita), education attainment (adult literacy and enrolment rates) and living a long healthy life
(life expectancy at birth). 
2. HPI-1 variables used are: the percentage of people expected to die before age 40; the percentage of adults who are
illiterate; and deprivation in overall economic provisioning-public and private-reflected by the percentage of people
without access to health services and safe water and the percentage of underweight children under five.
being constrained by available capacity and geopo-
litical developments as well as reliability of security
of supplies particularly given the volatility of the oil
rich Middle East countries. At the same time, rapid
growth in emerging markets, particularly of China,
and the strength of demand from other consumer
countries have been key factors to rising prices. 
The influence of OPEC on price levels cannot be
discounted. OPEC influences price levels and
movements by sending signals to futures markets
where reference prices are determined. Announce-
ments about production policy are now widely rec-
ognized as OPEC's signalling device. Decisions on
quota reduction, for example, are taken as an indi-
cator of OPEC's worry about bearish sentiments in
the market, which may lead prices to fall. Decisions
to increase production, on the other hand, are an
expression of OPEC's uneasiness about the high
price levels attained. On the whole, crude oil prices
behave like other commodities in the market, with
wide price swings in cases of shortage or oversupply. 
Figure 4: Brent and WTI daily prices 
1998 to 2005
Taking into account all these influences on crude
oil prices, Figure 4 shows a positive nonlinear price
trend from 1995 to early 2005 and with the Brent
price closely tracking WTI. The strong US economy
and the booming Asian Pacific region contributed to
price increases that extended into 1997. Decline in
rapid growth of the Asian economies in 1998 as
well as lower consumption and higher OPEC pro-
duction led to a downward spiral in prices. Prices
recovered in 1999 in response to: (i) OPEC restrict-
ing crude oil production (although not all the quo-
tas were observed); (ii) Asian growing oil demand
signifying recovery from crisis; and (iii) the shrinking
non-OPEC production. Prices continued to rise in
2000 and then plummeted in November 2001 fol-
lowing successive quota increases, a weakening US
economy and increases in non-OPEC production.
Soon afterwards, prices rose to the US$ 25 range,
and hovered above US$40 per barrel in 2004 as a
result of the continued fall of the US dollar, the
political tension in the Middle East, the high
demand for crude oil by China, and uncertainly
about the future of Yukos, the Russian producer. 
Bacon and Mattar (2005 p9) use 2003 as a ref-
erence period, and estimate that the average price
of Brent in recent years rose by 15% in 2003 to US$
28.8, and by 33% above the 2003 price in 2004,
ultimately by an average of 30% from 2004 to mid
2005. The price rise from 2003 to mid-2005 was
72% (from US$28.8 to US$ 49.5), and increased
above US$ 55 after mid-2005.
The impact of oil price shocks
Impact of higher prices
Consumers and energy-using producers suffer the
worst impact from oil price increases than do
increases of other commodities for several reasons.
As the prices rise, consumer and producers have lit-
tle flexibility in reducing their use of oil in the con-
sumption basket and as a factor of production, or
even to substitute between other alternative fuels.
This is because energy consuming appliances tend
to be fixed in the short run, thus limiting the poten-
tial for interfuel substitution. The result is that con-
sumers, given their preferences and willingness to
substitute between energy and other goods, and
producers, given the different characteristics of pro-
duction and the extent to which oil can be used in
different proportions with other energy and non-
energy factors, cannot easily change their con-
sumption pattern in the short run or shift to less oil
intensive means of production in response to
changes in the price of oil. In the transportation sec-
tor, demand for oil varies with different forms of
transportation so that the impact of price shocks
depends on the ability to adapt to particular forms
of transportation to make it more efficient. The flex-
ibility in the use of oil or energy in the long run
depends on a myriad of other macroeconomic vari-
ables such as employment, economic growth and
so forth. Our aggregative analysis conceals all these
factors but rather provides an on-the-spot impact of
price shocks. 
To determine the magnitude of the oil price
shock, we follow the Bacon and Mattar (2005)
methodology, and let
OV = (ML * PL) /GDP (1)
= PL * (ML/∑Lu) * (Lu/∑Eu) * (Eu/GDP) (2)
Where:
OV = Oil vulnerability
ML = Volume of net oil imports (oil con-
sumption minus oil production)
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GDP = Gross domestic product
PL = Price of oil
Lu = Total oil use
Eu = Total energy use
Expression (1) can be decomposed to some com-
ponents of oil vulnerability that allow us to estimate
the following: ML/Lu for oil import dependence,
Lu/Eu for dependence of oil as an oil resource, and
Eu/GDP for energy intensity. Furthermore, we
determine oil intensity using the ratio Lu/GDP. Let
us consider next the results on oil vulnerabilities
these components yield. 
Oil import dependence
A major factor explaining high oil vulnerability is
the extreme dependence of Southern African coun-
tries on imported oil. Except for Angola and the
DRC, all the countries are highly exposed to vul-
nerability to oil shocks with estimated ratios ML/Lu
= 1, indicating that they are 100% reliant on
imported crude oil. Our data sources show that
Angola and the DRC are net exporters of crude oil,
and that between 1998 and 2003, South Africa has
on average been importing 95% of its crude oil
requirements. This heavy dependence or reliance
on imported oil is coupled by other country specif-
ic factors that reveal impact of the oil shock and the
limited resources for the countries to cope with it.
From Table 1, most of Southern Africa suffers from
high external debts, high levels of human depriva-
tion (see HPI-1 index) and income inequality
(based on Gini coefficients), and that almost all
these countries have a significant proportion of their
population (between 50 and 87%) below the
poverty datum line of US $2 a day. These in turn
imply that the low levels of economic growth in
these countries are further constrained to accelerate
development and to achieve significant poverty
reduction levels. 
Dependence on oil as a resource, Lu/Eu, and
the impact of an oil shock
The variable Lu/Eu defines the share of oil in the
total energy mix, and is a useful factor in explaining
oil vulnerability. The expression Eu includes both
the commercial and non-commercial sources of
energy. A conceptual problem that arises with the
data for Lu/Eu is that this expression is based on
physical units rather than on expenditure shares.
The problem is minimised by expressing depend-
ence in terms of expenditure values as Lu * PL /Eu *
PL. As PL cancels out, we get the same results from
the two expressions. 
The results in Table 2 show that oil shares as a
proportion of total energy consumed per country
have been falling in most countries, but rising in
Angola, Botswana and Namibia. We deduce that
the impact of oil price shocks is severe for Namibia
with an average oil share above 60% and with the
highest vulnerability (0.046 in Table 3). As sum-
marised in Table 1, Namibia also has the high lev-
els of inequality, very low HPI-I and, like other
Southern African states, with a serious challenge of
alleviating poverty. Although the oil share for
Angola is high, Angola is a net crude oil exporter.
Other main energy sources in Namibia are
hydropower and biomass. Dependence is also high
for the economies of Botswana (46%), Malawi
(45%) and Lesotho (44%), which also suffer from
high levels of poverty, deprivation and inequality
(see Table 1).
We did not estimate cross price elasticities
between oil and other energy inputs to establish
interfuel substitution possibilities, mainly because of
the highly aggregated nature of our data. It would
be useful, for example, to examine the characteris-
tics of demand across the various sectors of the
economy, obviously expected to differ, and to illus-
trate the level of taxes/subsidies that would be
required to encourage ‘fuel-switching’. However,
we observe that the oil shares and the trend lines
(Table 2) for the rest of the countries are falling and
almost constant (flat) for South Africa. While the
trend lines for Botswana and Namibia as well as for
the net exporting countries are positive, it is fluctu-
ating and almost constant for South Africa, and
negative for the rest of the other countries. This can
be attributed to fuel substitution taking place.
Botswana records the least level of vulnerability and
rising oil share in its energy mix (Tables 3 and 2),
likely because of the diversification thrust as it pur-
sues its development policies.
Energy intensity, (Lu/GDP, Eu/GDP)
Energy and oil intensities are important factors that
explain oil vulnerability. Energy intensity is the
energy use per dollar of GDP, and is also the
amount of energy needed to support economic
activity. Simply, it is the cost of converting energy
into GDP, so that using less energy to produce the
same product reduces the intensity. Some analysts
argue that energy intensity is the inverse of energy
efficiency, so that any decline in energy intensity
can be regarded as a proxy for efficient improve-
ments. Validating this assertion would require infor-
mation on technology for the various sectors in dif-
ferent countries which, unfortunately, is concealed
in the highly aggregated nature of currently avail-
able data.
There is consensus in literature that low energy
intensity (meaning lower costs of converting energy
into GDP) keeps vulnerability down and, alterna-
tively, that increases in energy intensity leads to an
increase in vulnerability to oil shocks. With refer-
ence to Table 4, this implies that the higher the
energy intensity the more vulnerable the country is
to oil shocks. Similarly, low energy intensity helps to
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keep vulnerability down. The pattern of energy
intensity growth overtime in Southern Africa is
mixed, with some countries exhibiting a positive
growth trend (with Mozambique, Namibia and
Lesotho leading) and a negative trend experienced
by six countries. Countries with a negative trend
line show the following different percentage growth
patterns in energy intensity: a constant negative
trend for Congo (Kinshasa); a tendency for the data
series either to fluctuate constantly (Botswana) or
fall, then rise from 1998 or 1999 (Angola, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and
Tanzania), and for the data series to rise in 1998
and then maintain a negative trend thereafter
(Zimbabwe). South Africa data series falls from
1998 to 2002, and then picks up in 2003. 
There are two main problems with these energy
intensity results. Firstly, they are at an aggregate
level, with heterogeneous output. Secondly, the
large use of biomass in different countries is largely
uncaptured in GDP calculations.
Since most countries are completely dependent
on imported oil (that is, ML/Lu = 1), our results for
oil intensity are identical to those of oil vulnerability
reported in Table 3. Namibia, has the highest oil
intensity of GDP, and is more vulnerable to oil price
increases. The higher the oil intensity of GDP, the
more vulnerable the economy to oil price increases,
and the countries with a high oil/GDP ratio are
harder hit than the others. While Dargays (1990 p
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Table 2: Oil fuel dependence
Country Lu/Eu (0 < x < 1) Lu/Eu Lu/Eu
Average 2003 Fitted trend line R2
1994 – 2003
Angola 0.68 0.71 Rising 0.54
Botswana 0.44 0.46 Rising 0.51
DRC 0.35 0.21 Falling 0.8
Lesotho 0.60 0.44 Falling 0.76
Malawi 0.50 0.45 Falling 0.83
Mozambique 0.40 0.14 Falls sharply 0.85
Namibia1 0.62 0.64 Rising 0.59
South Africa 0.21 0.20 Constant (flat) 0.007
Swaziland 0.40 0.33 Falling 0.87
Tanzania 0.62 0.59 Falling 0.67
Zambia 0.23 0.23 Falling 0.15
Zimbabwe 0.27 0.24 Falling 0.57
Note: 1 data from 1995 to 2003
Table 3: Estimated size of shock (as a percentage of 2003 GDP)
Source: Calculations based on IEA data, 2003
Country Oil Effect of average Effect of average 2003 to
vulnerability price rise from 2003 price rise from 2004 mid-2005 
to 2004 (33%) to mid-2005 (72%) cumulative impact
Angola -0.779 -25.387 -55.389 -80.775
Botswana 0.009 0.312 0.681 0.993
DRC -0.009 -0.288 -0.628 -0.916
Lesotho 0.015 0.507 1.106 1.613
Malawi 0.035 1.145 2.497 3.642
Mozambique 0.023 0.754 1.645 2.399
Namibia 0.046 1.532 3.343 4.875
South Africa 0.034 1.138 2.483 3.622
Swaziland 0.025 0.826 1.802 2.628
Tanzania 0.022 0.710 1.548 2.258
Zimbabwe 0.021 0.687 1.498 2.185
Note: Angola and the DRC are net oil exporters, hence the negative results shown
15) contends that the oil intensity of GDP rises from
low to middle income, and being lowest for coun-
tries with highest incomes, our results do not quite
confirm this finding. Rather, we agree with Bacon
and Mattar (2005) about the lack of a significant
correlation between changes in oil intensity and the
growth in GDP per capita. However, we expect
improved data to reflect increasing oil intensity as
modern commercial fuels substitute traditional fuels
in the household sector, and as transportation, eco-
nomic growth and development continue.
Table 4: Energy intensities
Source: Calculations based on IEA data, 2003
Country Energy intens- R2 [Υ =α Energy
ity for 2003 +βΧ + βΧ2 intensity
(Btu/ 2000   (1994 to trend
US$ using 2003)] line
market exchange Υ = time
rates) Χ = data
Angola 11 489 0.69 Falling
Botswana 9 014 0.49 Falling 
Lesotho 6 882 0.70 Rising 
Malawi 14 836 0.90 Falling
DRC 4 861 0.80 Falling
Mozambique 32 820 0.92 Rising
Namibia 13 924 0.81 Rising 
South Africa 35 348 0.52 Falling 
Swaziland 14 349 0.60 Rising 
Tanzania 7 208 0.62 Rising 
Zimbabwe 16 693 0.64 Falling 
A number of factors explain why some countries
have different energy intensity patterns. Firstly,
energy prices are a major influence on energy use
and therefore on energy intensity. Energy prices
vary between countries depending on energy con-
suming technology, availability of fuel and regulato-
ry regimes in place. Secondly, as in Bernstein et al
(2003 p 14), capital investment and new construc-
tions tend to have lower energy intensity because
the new infrastructure is usually more energy effi-
cient. Thirdly, the way energy types are mixed to
produce output drives the demand for energy. The
structure and the composition of economic output
among the countries differ, thus affecting energy
intensity. Fourthly, changes in demographic factors
influence energy use and have an impact on ener-
gy intensity. For example employment and income
growth lead to increased energy consuming appli-
ances. Fifthly, technological change and penetration
of modern appliances can either make energy use
more efficient or increase energy intensity for some
end uses. But expenditure on new equipment to
replace old capital stock is often more efficient than
the equipment being replaced. We expect all these
factors to be at play for the various countries, there-
by yielding different patterns of intensity results. 
Undoubtedly, the risk of reducing energy price
volatility implies taking into account benefits of
reducing this exposure by measures such as energy
efficiency, structural change, choices about energy
investment and through strategic petroleum
reserves. This, at least, guarantees that any oil price
shock would cause less economic disruption, rela-
tive to GDP. 
Challenges
The challenge Southern African countries face is to
reduce dependence on imported oil while also
meeting the challenge of development and eco-
nomic growth. Oil and energy intensity through a
variety of options. A very useful option is to disag-
gregate the data by sector, estimate the demand
pattern of each sector and determine the cross-price
elasticities of substitution for the different energy
types and sectors. This gives useful information on
the degree of substitution possibilities between oil
and other energy types using fiscal policy and other
financial incentives. The fiscal tool can also be used
to encourage energy conservation, to promote tran-
sition to a lower energy intensity mix of economic
activities, and to encourage an optimal fuel mix,
depending on the distributional impact of the poli-
cy measure taken. Other demand management
strategies involve improved energy end-use effi-
ciency in industry, transportation and buildings.
There is also a challenge for energy policy for these
countries in terms of exploiting renewables.
But all these likely cases should be pursued
through a combination of incentives, investments,
and other measures that affect choices made with
the available array of technological options and
through research and development.
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